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1. Introduction
Analytic philosophy of literature appears to be in a state of flux. On the one hand, there is a
growing interest in interdisciplinary study and dialogue with other disciplines that can be
seen in the study of fiction and narratives, for instance. On the other hand, there is a—mostly
implicit—disagreement about the very aims and methods of the analytic approach, for
example, whether it should engage in a dialogue with literary studies or psychology and
neurosciences, or to be a ‘pure’ philosophical enterprise. In this essay, I shall explore the
aims and methods, and the problems and prospects, of analytic philosophy of literature. I
shall first briefly discuss the characteristic and history of analytic philosophy of literature.
After that, I shall examine certain alleged weaknesses of the analytic approach, such as its
neglect for the historical and the empirica. Finally, I shall consider the prospects of the
analytic enterprise and suggest how it can contribute to our understanding of literature.
2. Analytic Philosophy and Aesthetics
During the recent decades, analytic philosophers have become interested in theoretical self-
reflection and the history of their approach1. Michael Dummet, for one, claims that ‘[i]t is
important to analytical philosophy that it understand its own history, seeing itself in the
context of the general history of philosophy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries:
especially is this true at a time when it is undergoing profound changes.’2 Likewise, Avrum
Stroll holds that analytic philosophy is ‘essentially a humanistic endeavour’ and thus
‘intimately tied to its past in a way that science is not’3. These sort of commonsensical
remarks are interesting, for analytic philosophers have often considered philosophy an
1 Current metaphilosophical discussions on the nature of analytic philosophy are often seen to originate from
Dummet’s work Origins of Analytic Philosophy (1993)—or his earlier work on Frege. For a comprehensive
overview of the key themes in the discussion, see Hans-Johann Glock’s What is Analytic Philosophy (2008).
For recent work in the history of analytic philosophy, see e.g. The Oxford Handbook of the History of
Analytic Philosophy, edited by Michael Beaney (2013).
2 Dummet 1998, p. 1
3 Stroll 2000, p. 246
Published in Selleri A., Gaydon P. (eds.) Literary Studies and the Philosophy of Literature
New Interdisciplinary Directions. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. ISBN 978-3-319-33146-1. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33147-8
2ahistorical activity, the most radical ones even wanting to outsource the study of the history
of philosophy for the history of ideas4.
But what is analytic philosophy? The philosopher Dagfinn Føllesdal introduces three
customary ways to define a philosophical tradition: (i) by methods, (ii) by doctrines or
problems, and (iii) by genetic relations. As Føllesdal however shows, these sort of definitions
make analytic philosophy either so narrow that it excludes some key figures of the enterprise
or so broad that it includes figures that are clearly outside the tradition.5 To begin with, there
seems to be no unified view of the analytic method, let alone analysis6. Not all analytic
philosophers have engaged in conceptual analysis or some other kind of analysis of unifying
kind. On the other hand, some non-analytic philosophers—Husserl, and even Socrates—
analysed concepts7. As for doctrines, there is no a shared view of the aim and nature of
philosophy among analytic philosophers. For instance, the characteristic which Simon
Critchley implicitly attributes to analytic philosophy, that is, scientism (or naturalism)8, does
not unite all but only some analytic philosophers. Defining analytic philosophy in terms of
problems it studies seems also untenable, for the same problems are studied in other
philosophical traditions. Appeals to schools or genetic relations are also problematic: for
example, Bolzano anticipated the ideas of Frege, Carnap, Tarski and Quine and treated the
ideas in an ‘analytic’ manner; yet, Bolzano did not have a teacher–student relationship to any
analytic philosopher proper9.
4 See Grafton 2004, p. 318
5 Føllesdal 1993, pp. 3–7. Føllesdal thinks that analytic philosophy is best understood an approach ‘very
strongly concerned with argument and justification’ (ibid., p. 7). For problems in defining analytic
philosophy in terms of doctrines or methods, see Glock (2008, chs. 5 & 6). For historical and contemporary
views of the nature of analytic philosophy, see Preston (2010).
6 Michael Beaney (2007, p. 1), for one, remarks that ‘both Russell and Moore were notoriously unclear as to
what exactly “analysis” meant, and they use the term in a number of ways throughout their writings’.
7 Some analytic philosophers have suggested that the analytic method, understood as conceptual analysis, indeed
traces its roots back to Socrates. As L. Jonathan Cohen (1986, p. 49) summarizes it, ‘[a]nalytical philosophy
is occupied, at an appropriately general level, and in a great variety of ways, with the reasoned discussion of
what can be a reason for what. As such it is a strand in the total history of western philosophy from Socrates
onwards rather than just a modern movement.’
8 Critchley 1998, p. 12
9 See Raatikainen 2013, p. 13
3It might be best to speak of analytic philosophy as a manner of tackling philosophical
problems. Analytic philosophy is often characterized as an approach that emphasizes
conceptual clarity, coherence and argumentation, and attempts to achieve its ends by the use
of formal logic and linguistic analysis, for instance. Analytic philosophers also
characteristically emphasize objectivity and truth and tend to consider philosophical
problems timeless and universal.10
Since the beginning, analytic philosophers have had a special interest in literature. Roughly,
there are two central reasons for this. First, analytic philosophers have traditionally been
concerned with questions about language. As William Elton put it in his introduction for
Aesthetics and Language (1954), the aim of the anthology was ‘to diagnose and clarify some
aesthetic confusions, which it holds to be mainly linguistic in origin’11. Literature, being
essentially a linguistic art form, was a rather obvious object for philosophers studying issues
such as meaning, truth, and reference, and language in general. Second, analytic
philosophers’ excitement for literary works of characteristically fictional kind is also
understandable, for fictionality brings up questions related to ontology and logic, such as the
question of the nature of fictional characters. Nevertheless, in the analytic tradition,
philosophers’ interest in fictional literature has been twofold. Roughly, aestheticians have
studied literature as a form of art, whereas philosophers working in other areas have turned to
literary works in order to illustrate or test their theories of ontology or meaning, for example.
However, these two ways to approach the subject converge in theories of fictionality, for
example.
For the first generation analytic aestheticians, the aim of aesthetics was, as Arnold Isenberg
defines it in the conclusion of his 1950 report to the Rockefeller Foundation, ‘an analysis of
the concepts and principles of criticism and other aesthetic studies, such as the psychology of
art’12. Furthermore, Monroe C. Beardsley’s influential work Aesthetics, subtitled ‘Problems
10 See Lamarque 2009, viii. For characteristics of analytic philosophy, see also Soames (2006, xi–xv). One
should note that the interest in formal logic does not unite all analytic philosophers—it excludes ordinary
language philosophers, for example—and, further, that many logicians have based their theory of logic in
phenomenological philosophy (see Raatikainen 2013, pp. 12–13).
11 Elton 1954, p. 1
12 Isenberg 1987, p. 128; emphasis in original. Peter Lamarque (2013, pp. 770–771) remarks that ‘analytical
methods’ had been applied to aesthetics already in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, in prominent philosophical
4in the Philosophy of Criticism’ and published in 1958, greatly substantied this view, in which
analytic aesthetics was considered a second-order discipline that aims at clarifying and
refining critical terms by investigating the practice of criticism13. Originally, analytic
aesthetics aimed to get rid of ‘dreariness’ in aesthetics, as John Passmore put it, and, by being
ruthless in making distinctions, to reveal the characteristics of its subject matter.14
Nevertheless, it has repeatedly been claimed that analytic aesthetics has became dreary and
dull itself. Literary critics and philosophers in other traditions have not paid much attention to
analytic philosophical study of literature, which the art scholar Karl-Heinz Lüdeking thinks is
due to that analytic philosophy is ‘widely considered to be pettifogging, boring and
irrelevant’15.
I shall next discuss some features of the analytic approach which are often cited as reasons
for that literary scholars and philosophers in others traditions do not find analytic aesthetics
appealing. Rather than seeing them as limits of the analytic enterprise, I consider them
potential obstacles and pitfalls, which analytic philosophers of literature should acknowledge
in order for their theories to be more illuminating and telling. The problems I shall discuss are
themselves abstractions, and many analytic philosophers are aware of them and reflect them
in their work; perhaps it would be best to describe them as problematic tendencies or ghosts
that haunt in the discipline.
3. Obstacles & Pitfalls
To begin with, there is a potential problem in the way analytic aestheticians approach their
questions, or the secondariness of the discipline16. As philosophers Peter Lamarque and Stein
Haugom Olsen remark, analytic aesthetics ‘has tended to give priority to topics arising from
concerns elsewhere in philosophy’. Further, Lamarque and Olsen think that ‘[t]he emphasis
journals and works such as David W. Prall’s Aesthetic Judgment (1929) and Aesthetic Analysis (1936) and
John Hospers’ Meaning and Truth in the Arts (1946).
13 For a similar view of aesthetics as a philosophy of criticism, see Jerome Stolnitz’s Aesthetics and Philosophy
of Art Criticism (1960).
14 Passmore 1951, pp. 320 & 327
15 Lüdeking 2010, p. 100
16 The early analytic philosophy of literature may be considered ‘secondary’ in two senses, as it considered itself
subordinate to the main areas of philosophy and ancillary to literary criticism. Of these, the weakness
discussed relates to the former sense of secondariness.
5on logic and philosophy of language, for example, led inevitably to an interest in questions
about meaning and truth in aesthetics’17. It is somewhat troublesome that questions in
analytic philosophy of literature often derive from questions in certain core areas in
philosophy, such as epistemology, and especially that they employ the concepts used in
studying these ‘primary’ matters. For example, the questions of authorial intention and the
‘meaning’ of a literary work, and the focus on propositions, originate from the philosophy of
language and theory of meaning. Such questions, although interesting from a philosophical
point of view, might not shed much light on literature as literature or help us to understand
aesthetic values18. Even though many contemporary philosophers of literature focus on the
distinctive questions that derive from our encounters with literary works (and literary practice
in general), together with theoretical questions formulated by literary scholars, one of the
burdens of analytic aesthetics and philosophy of literature is that it still considers itself
subservient to the ‘major’ areas in philosophy, an approach where literary works serve rather
as a test case for theories of meaning.
Another putative problem with the analytic enterprise relates to its urge for ahistorical
objectivity, an ideal which manifests itself both in analytic philosophers’ conception of
philosophical problems and their notion of ‘literature’. Analytic philosophers tend to treat
philosophical problems as timeless and ahistorical, by appealing to logic and argument rather
than observations of social, political and ideological factors19. Nevertheless, it has often been
claimed that analytic philosophers lack historical self-reflection and that this lack is an
obstacle for the proper comprehension of the problems. Nicholas Wolterstorff, an analytic
philosopher himself, states that analytic philosophers do not ponder why historical
philosophers have asked the questions they have asked and used the concepts they have used.
Neither, Wolterstorff claims, do analytic philosophers ponder why they themselves ask the
questions they ask20. Many have connected the lack of self-reflection to alleged crises in
analytic philosophy. Jaakko Hintikka, for example, asserts that the survival of analytic
17 Lamarque & Olsen 2004a, p. 4
18 For a recent formulation of this view, see Landy 2012, pp. 4–11
19 See Lamarque & Olsen 2004a, p. 2
20 Wolterstorff 2003, p. 20–21. Richard Rorty, in turn, sees analytic philosophy as ‘an attempt to escape from
history—an attempt to find nonhistorical conditions of any possible historical development’ (Rorty 1980, p.
9).
6philosophy requires theoretical self-reflection and a change from within21. On a smaller scale,
the dismissal of the historical background of philosophical problems and the focus on logical
issues may lead to a situation in which problems in the philosophy of literature start to live
their life as abstract debates, distanced from the significance of the problems in our
encounters with literature, as in certain discussions on authorial intention, theory of fiction, or
the debate on readers ‘imaginative resistance’ to deviant moral views in literature.
Gilbert Ryle once remarked that the ‘wise rambler occasionally, though not incessantly, looks
back over his shoulder in order to link up the place he has got to with the country through
which he has recently passed’. As Ryle pointed out, one’s attempts to trace one’s ‘proximate
origins’ are valuable by improving one’s ‘sense of direction’ and helping one to understand
‘the contemporary scene’22. A glance at recent work in the philosophy of literature suggests
that many contemporary analytic philosophers consider it important to track the history of the
problem they are scrutinizing. Contemporary philosophers also like to discuss the raisons
d’être of their inquiry23.
Still, one may ask for more context-sensitivity and attention for the particular in analytic
philosophy of literature, as the tendency to overt abstractions can be seen in many analytic
philosophers’ notion of literature, for example. Analytic philosophers often speak of literature
as if there would be a common, transhistorical concept of ‘literature’, and ignore the various
historical and contemporary uses of the word. Further, we analytic philosophers have
traditionally considered realistic literature as the model for literature tout court (realism
considered here both a historical literary movement and a mode of representation). Arguably,
our interest in realism stems from our liking of uncomplicated24 literary examples and our
emphasis on objectivity and truth. This idea of objectivity is apparent, for instance, in those
theories of ‘fictional truth’ which take the narrator to offer us a transparent view to the world
of the work, as well as discussions on the ‘meaning’ of the work, where it is thought that
21 Hintikka 1998, p. 260
22 Ryle 1957, p. 1. Bernard Williams also argues that analytic philosophy should be more concerned with the
past. For his defence of historical approaches in philosophical enterprise, see Williams (2002) and (2008)
23 See e.g. Why Literary Studies? Raisons D’être of a Discipline, edited by Anders Pettersson and Stein Haugom
Olsen (2011).
24 Literary examples have often been considered too compliated and detailed for moral philosophical examples
(see Phillips 1982, 9).
7literary works have a certain fixed meaning that is determined by the author and/or the text,
and the reader’s task in to reconstruct that meaning. What is not problematized is that
generalizations drawn from Tolstoy’s novels might not carry to modernism and beyond.
Indeed, it is frequently said that analytic philosophers operate with obsolete conceptions of
literature and literary criticism. Tzachi Zamir remarks that
‘[P]hilosophical criticism appears to operate within the conceptual parameters of the
New Criticism and the Arnoldian humanism and romaticism that underlie it. The
charge is that philosophical criticism has not seriously dealt with the numerous
challenges to formalism within literary studies. It thus replays the ‘Old Criticism’
practiced before the cultural turn in literary studies, and it does this without
addressing the reasons that have led literary critics to avoid thematic reflection
through poetry.’25
In addition to an obsolete view of literature (or the focus on realism), an obsolete view of
literary criticism is problematic in analytic philosophical theories which seek to justify their
theoretical claims via criticism or present descriptive claims about what critics do in
interpreting literary works.
What is also dubious is analytic philosophers’ striving for universality26. For example,
thinking of the diversity of works of literature, it is questionable if there could ever be a
theory of the cognitive value of literature that would be both extensive and non-trivial. Some
works elicit emotions that migh contribute to cognition, some provide imaginative
experiences that might count as subjective knowledge, some may be seen similar to thought-
experiement in philosophy. Because of the universaling tendency, it seems difficult for
analytic philosophers to engage in a dialogue with literary critics, at least those who hold that
critical concepts are more or less tied to particular works and that the literary work under
analysis modifies and contests the theoretical concepts needed to understand it27.
25 Zamir 2007, pp. 44–45.
26 On the other hand, a focus on narrow genres, such as rock covers or self-portrait photography, has become
common in contemporary analytic aesthetics.
27 Here, see Eagleton 2012, p. 14
8My final concern in the analytic enterprise is its unconcern for the empirical. For instance,
the literary critic Anders Pettersson remarks that analytic philosophical theories of literary
interpretation seldom make reference to empirical studies of literary reception, although the
theories claim to describe ‘the practice of reading’28. Indeed, philosophical debates on
readers’ ‘typical motives’, for example, often stagnate at intentions. But our horror mundi
manifests itself also in other ways, such as our eagerness to use invented examples in
illustrating our views. Examples drawn from literature, in turn, are thought to bring
unnecessary complexity—interpretive issues—into one’s thinking of the logical aspects of
the problem. Thus, say, the thought-experiment of a historical novel in which every sentence
would be asserted by the author. While examples of this sort well illustrate the philosophical
argument at hand, their artificiality causes suspicion: how plausible is a theory of literature
(or fictionality) that requires invented examples?
The issues introduced are matters that are repeatedly said to lessen the credibility of the
analytic approach in the eyes of literary scholars and others interested in the intersections of
philosophy and literature. Of course, the emphasis on logical matters, for instance, is not only
a characteristic of the analytic approach but also one of its chief virtues; it is not the logical
emphasis that is problematic but rather the philosopher’s overt abstractions and her invention
of hypothetical examples that are aimed to illustrate her theory. Also, it is difficult to say
what is the conception of literature relevant to philosophical aesthetics, which is more or less
general in nature. Nevertheless, it would greatly benefit the analytic approach, would analytic
philosophers articulate and problematize these issues, acknowledge historical changes in the
practices of literature and literary criticism and engage directly and in detail with particular
literary works.
4. The Role of Analytic Philosophy of Literature
Although there has been relatively little metaphilosophical discussion within analytic
philosophy of literature, one may find, roughly, three popular aspects to the role of analytic
philosophy of literature. These are the analysis of critical concepts, a philosophy of science,
and the study of the ‘phenomenon of literature’.
Analysis of critical concepts
28 Pettersson 2008, p. 63
9As said, analytic aesthetics was originally understood as the philosophy of criticism or
metacriticism, its purpose being to investigate critical concepts and principles. This is a view
which Richard Shusterman, for instance, still emphasizes in his introduction for the
anthology Analytic Aesthetics (1989)29. Many if not most contemporary analytic aestheticians
think, however, that the study of the fundamental issues in criticism—its methods, aims, and
concepts—is not only too narrow but also a misguided description of aesthetics. Kathleen
Stock and Katherine Thomson-Jones, for instance, remark that analytic aestheticians today
are critical to the ‘narrow analytic program’ of the pioneering analytic aestheticians. As they
observe, the scope of aesthetics today is broader and more diverse than the mere analysis of
concepts and principles. Also, questions in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind are given
much attention in contemporary aesthetics.30
Indeed, Beardsley’s tripartite distinction, in which the philosopher studies what the critic
says about the poet’s work31, is no longer tenable. Peter Lamarque has forcefully shown that
criticism is too diverse a field that a methodologically coherent view of it could be presented
and that metacriticism will fail both as a descriptive and normative exercise: Because of the
multiplicity of critical approaches, descriptive metacriticism, which aims to explain critical
principles, could only deliver a set of principles relative to each approach. In turn, normative
metacriticism, which aims to formulate interpretative principles that ought to be followed,
would simply describe the principles of a given approach, and the validity of those principles
would become disputed after the critical approach had been declined.32 Moreover, the
philosophy of literature cannot be construed as metacriticism because of its concern for
questions falling outside criticism. Nonetheless, there are some contemporary aestheticians
who think that philosophy of literature consists to a large part of metacriticism. For example,
in On Criticism (2009), Noël Carroll maintains ‘that the time has come to rejuvenate
[metacriticism], since there is probably more art criticism being produced and consumed now
than ever before in the history of the world’33. The idea of philosophy of literature as
metacriticism is also implicit in many analytic philosophers’ work.
29 Shusterman 1989, p. 7
30 See Stock & Thomson-Jones 2008, xii
31 Beardsley 1958, pp. 3–7
32 Lamarque 2009, p. 7
33 Carroll 2009, p. 1
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While the philosophy of literature is not to be identified with metacriticism, there is need for
philosophy of literature as an analysis of critical concepts, where analysis is understood not
only as descriptive analysis that purports to show how concepts are used in criticism but also
as constructive analysis that aims to reformulate concepts that are vague or indeterminate,
such as ‘fiction’ and ‘narrative’.
It has been common to defend the analytic enterprise by contrasting it with critical theory—
which is seen to embrace disbelief in rationality and truth and to prefer persuasion over
argumentation—and by emphasizing the clarity, precision and argumentative strength of the
analytic enterprise34. Sure enough, clarity, precision, and argumentativity are prospects of the
analytic enterprise. Extensive conceptual analysis and the insistence on detail and mechanics
are characteristic of the analytic enterprise and invaluable in analyzing critical concepts,
theories, and disputes. Moreover, clarity and coherence do not need to exclude profundity35.
In turn, those critics of the analytic approach who have no education in philosophy might
have difficulties in differentiating between the philosopher’s aims and methods, and to
understand the context and meaning of the analysis36. As the literary critic David Gorman
puts it,
‘for better or worse, the power and interest of analytic philosophy lies in its technical
details more than its large programmatic generalizations; and unless literary theorists
are willing to master some of this detail, they can write at length about analytic
philosophy, but without any insight.’37
Certainly, there are good reasons for analytic philosophers’ logico-systematic inquiries. As
Lamarque and Olsen put it,
‘it has long been thought a merit of [the analytic] enterprise that it favors slow,
meticulous work – finding strong arguments to support precise, clearly defined theses
– over generalizations weakly or imprecisely defended. Certainly, debates by analytic
34 See e.g. Lamarque & Olsen 2004b, pp. 199–200
35 Åhlberg 1993, p. 15
36 See Gorman 1990, p. 656
37 Gorman 1990, p. 656; emphasis in original
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aestheticians seem to move slowly, but that is because attention to detail is highly
valued.’38
The piecemeal effort and insistence on detail may also produce theoretical tools. The literary
critic Peter Swirski thinks that it would greatly improve literary critics’ work would they be
familiar with David Lewis’s Reality and Mutual Belief principles and with their roles in the
analysis of fictional truth and implicit story content.39 Likewise, Terry Eagleton argues that
‘the rigour and technical expertise of the best philosophy of literature contrasts favourably
with the intellectual looseness of some literary theory, and as has addressed questions left
mostly unexamined by those in the other camp’, such as fictionality40. Clearly, analytic
philosophy is at its best in ‘slow, meticulous work’ and its attention to detail, and there is
need for it as a metacritical, clarificatory enterprise.
A philosophy of science
Philosophers of literature have not only investigated literary criticism but also other
approaches to literature. For example, the study of the ‘psychology of art’ has been part of
analytic aesthetics since the beginning, and recently more and more analytic philosophers
have been eager to turn to the sciences of mind in order to advance traditional debates in
aesthetics. Gregory Currie, for one, maintains that aestheticians should get out of the
armchair and look at different branches of psychology, neuroscience, linguistics and
economic and sociological studies of the art market41. (Currie, however, wisefully reminds
one that ‘the problems with which aestheticians deal are very various, and not all of them
ought to be approached in the same way’42.) In particular, Currie is dissatisfied with
philosophers who make empirical claims about the educative function of literature but
provide no evidence for their claims. He suggests that in discussing the effects which literary
works are claimed to have on their readers, philosophers should look at studies conducted in
experimental psychology.43 And what is the role of philosophy? Currie thinks that none of the
empirical studies ‘will be worth much unless we retain a commitment to the clarity that
38 Lamarque & Olsen 2004a, p. 5; see also Swirski 2010, p. 11
39 Swirski 2010, p. 12
40 Eagleton 2012, p. 11
41 Currie 2013, pp. 435–436
42 Currie 2013, p. 442
43 Currie 2013, p. 448
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philosophical reflection of a traditional kind can bring.’44 As he sees it, the role of philosophy
is to formulate theoretical models, ‘especially given that psychological work in this area
sometimes suffers from an impoverished view of the explanatory options.’45
On the other hand, there is need for philosophical considerations in assessing the explanatory
power of scientific approaches to literature. Philosophical reflection is required in analyzing
the assumptions, concepts and results of empirical studies of literary reception. Of course,
studying scientific approaches to literature does not require one’s committing to them;
sceptics are welcome too. One of the crucial questions is whether psychological studies—
which generally do not distinguish between ‘unskilled’ and ‘skilled’ readers, for instance—
may illuminate the practices of reading works of literature as works of art46.
A philosophy of (literary) art
In addition to analysing critical concepts and exploring literary critical and scientific study of
literature, there is need for the philosophy of literature in the most comprehensive sense as a
philosophy of art. This conception of the discipline is supported by Peter Lamarque and Stein
Haugom Olsen, who emphasize the need of an aesthetics of literature that studies the act of
reading imaginative literature and the nature of values and appreciation associated with
literary works47. Lamarque, for one, thinks that philosophy should explore the ‘fundamental
principles’ and ‘conceptual connections’ in the practice of literature48. In his view, the
philosopher of literature studies
‘the phenomenon, common to most if not all cultures, of elevating certain kinds of
linguistic activities – notably story-telling or poetry-making or drama – to an art form
issuing in products that are revered and of cultural significance’49.
This sort of study is not an empirical enquiry into a particular empirical institution; rather it
‘looks at foundational issues in the inquiry itself, its methods, aims, presuppositions, modes
44 Currie 2013, pp. 435–436
45 Currie (forthcoming)
46 See Lamarque 2014, p. 200n
47 Lamarque & Olsen 2004b, p. 203
48 Lamarque 2009, vii
49 Lamarque 2009, p. 8
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of argument or evidence or reasoning, the status of its central claims, and its basic
concepts.’50 However, Lamarque remarks that a philosophical investigation is not worth
much if it becomes too abstract or if it loses touch with the literary works themselves or
critical works that comment on them.51
Trends and approaches in criticism change fast, and philosophy of literature is needed in
drawing an overall picture of the phenomenon of literature: a picture that includes the author,
the work, and the reader. The object of such a study is the literary practice, literary values,
and the experience of literature—including all its aesthetic, cognitive, emotional and ethical
dimensions. In this comprehensive view, philosophical analysis is a means in studying
literature as human action and a distinct artform.
5. Endword
In this essay, I have discussed the problems and prospects of analytic philosophy of literature.
While I have said that there are certain obstacles and pitfalls in the analytic approach which
analytic philosophers should acknowledge in their work in order to make their views more
credible in the eyes of literary scholars, I think there will always be a certain kind of
divergence between philosophers, who aim for generality and like the multiplicity of
examples, and literary critics, who are interested in particular works and different ways by
which the content of a given work might be rendered. The gap between the disciplines is
likely to remain, but I do not consider it simply as a problem. There is no progress without
dialectic, and the discrepancy between philosophy and literary studies is intriguing as it
prevents theoretical stagnation.
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